The Question of War With North Korea
By Devon Bowers
This was originally published on AHTribune.com.
The summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un while photo worthy, was a disaster. Yet, it wasn’t due to Trump ‘getting played’ as so many in the media would have one think, but rather was due to the US wanting to make demands without offering any concessions.
North Korea released a statement early July 2018 in which they “accused the Trump administration on Saturday of pushing a “unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization’ and called [the meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo] ‘deeply regrettable.” More importantly, after the summit, President Trump went and said that North Korea was still an “extraordinary threat,” despite the whole intention of the summit being to lower tensions between the two nations. Given the fact that war between the two (and allied nations) may still break out, it would be pertinent to discuss what such a war would look like, starting with interested parties.
The United States
The US has been deeply involved in the Korean peninsula for the past nearly seven decades and currently has around 28,000 personnel deployed there. While times have changed, the US still retains major interests with regards to the peninsula.
Generally, US concerns with NK include “verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,” the halting of “nuclear or ballistic missile proliferation,” and reduction of tensions with Japan.
The US is especially concerned with North Korea’s nuclear program, as can be seen in their training exercises. In December 2017, US troops trained in exercise Warrior Strike IX which “[putting] them on North Korean soil, with the objective of ‘infiltrating’ and ‘removing weapons of mass destruction.” Such exercises are nothing new, as in March 2013, the US began its Winter Wargame in which they simulated “how many American troops would be needed to go in and secure North Korea's nuclear arsenal if Kim's regime collapsed.”
Collapse is also a concern as it “would have severe implications for trade and the regional—if not global—economy” and “the potential for major strategic consequences (including control of the North’s nuclear arsenal) and a massive humanitarian crisis, not to mention long-term economic and social repercussions, loom large.” Such drills are of major concern for the North Korean leadership which has always condemned such exercises and sees them as dangerous and provocative.
Nuclear weapons are extremely important for the North Korean government as not only are the drills seen as a threat, but, looking around the world, they have right to be concerned. In private meetings, North Korean officials “have often stated that they do not intend to become ‘another Iraq’ or ‘another Libya’– countries that, in the North Korean view, succumbed to the United States because they did not have a ‘nuclear deterrent.” This is further supported by that fact that Donald Greg, US ambassador to Seoul under President Obama, was told by the North Koreans, “we noticed you never attack anyone with nuclear weapons so that's why we developed them” and issued a statement after the attack on Libya, which read, in part:
The situation in Libya is a lesson for the international community. It has been shown to the corners of the earth that Libya's giving up its nuclear arms, which the U.S. liked to chatter on about, was used as an invasion tactic to disarm the country by sugarcoating it with words like 'the guaranteeing of security' and 'the bettering of relations. (emphasis added)
Despite the government being labeled such things as ‘insane’ and ‘crazy’ they are acting quite rationally using their nuclear program as a deterrent from unwanted US interference and invasion.
The reliance on nuclear weapons makes sense, given past incidents involving the US, such as the Chenonan incident in 2010, where the South Korean ship, the Cheonan, sunk and blame was immediately laid at the feet of North Korea. This is despite some people questioning the evidence being presented to the public and questions being raised even in South Korea’s own official reports.
There was also the Sony hack in December 2014. North Korea was accused of hacking the corporation when they released The Interview, a comedy film that was critical of the North Korean government. As soon as the hack occurred, NK was already being blamed, with the FBI saying that “it determined North Korea was responsible based on an analysis of the malware involved and its similarities to previous attacks the U.S. government [attributed] to North Korean-allied hackers, including an assault on South Korean banks and media outlets in 2013.” In response to the hack, the US placed sanctions on NK. However, what is interesting in regards to all of this is that it is quite questionable if North Korea was in fact the source of the hacking.
If you are a victim of hacking, especially on a national level, it can be quite difficult to determine who is responsible. Bruce Schneier, a fellow and lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School, noted in an Atlantic article:
Ordinarily, you could determine who the attacker was by the weaponry. When you saw a tank driving down your street, you knew the military was involved because only the military could afford tanks. Cyberspace is different. In cyberspace, technology is broadly spreading its capability, and everyone is using the same weaponry: hackers, criminals, politically motivated hacktivists, national spies, militaries, even the potential cyberterrorist. They are all exploiting the same vulnerabilities, using the same sort of hacking tools, engaging in the same attack tactics, and leaving the same traces behind. They all eavesdrop or steal data. They all engage in denial-of-service attacks. They all probe cyberdefences and do their best to cover their tracks. (emphasis added)
Due to many different actors utilizing similar tactics and techniques to obtain information, quickly pointing fingers seems to do a disservice.
While the military realm of North Korea has been aggressive, the diplomatic realm has been something of a mixed bag.
President Obama’s main goals with regards to NK were to 1) keep Six Party Talks open, however, with the caveat that NK take ‘irreversible’ steps to denuclearize first, 2) insist that the Talks be preceded by an improvement in relations between the two Koreas, and 3) respond “to Pyongyang’s provocations by tightening sanctions against North Korean entities, conducting a series of military exercises, and expanding U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation.” This was a policy of ‘strategic patience’ which was essentially a carrot-and-stick approach of handling North Korea, where talks and deals could be made in times of peace, but when problems mounted, sanctions would come into play. There were some major problems with this, as rather than focusing on denuclearization of North Korea, the Obama administration seemed more concerned about non-proliferation of WMDs. This is supported by statements from US officials such as “Jeff Bader, former Senior Director on the East Asian Affairs in the National Security Council, [who] stated in an interview that while pursing bilateral talks with North Korea, the United States would focus on reducing, delaying and freezing the North Korean nuclear program, leaving complete denuclearization in the hands of history.”
Obama’s strategy didn’t work from the get-go as North Korea left the six party talks after “Pyongyang test-fired a modified Taepo Dong-2 three-stage rocket, ostensibly as part of its civilian space program” to which the UN Security Council “issued a presidential statement April 13  calling the test a violation of Resolution 1718, and expanded sanctions on North Korean firms shortly afterwards.” Furthermore, this focus on proliferation rather than denuclearization allowed North Korea to make gains in its program, most notably, by conducting “two underground nuclear explosions and several banned missile tests” in April 2013.
Relations deteriorated further in April 2016 with President Obama stating that “we [the US] could, obviously, destroy North Korea with our [nuclear] arsenals.” This was in the context of increased tensions as just a month earlier (March 2016) the US and South Korea launched two military drills, one of which was Operation Key Resolve which tested “the new U.S.-South Korean military strategy operation plan, Operations Plan 5015, which aims to deter North Korea's possible use of weapons of mass destruction by preemptive attack.” From NK’s perspective, the exercise was “offensive rather than defensive and is aimed at occupying [North Korea] by preemptive strike.” It was further noted:
The aggressive nature of the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises is also apparent in setting their targets, like examination of feasibility of operations like “removal of the leadership,” “occupying Pyongyang,” “regime change,” “preemptive nuclear strike” and “decapitation raids,” which can never be found in other countries’ joint military drills.
While idea of war was in the background, the US 2016 presidential elections brought someone who, at least at first, seemed to strike a different tone on the matter.
The 2016 elections saw the explosion of unlikely presidential candidate Donald Trump, who brought some unconventional thinking to the political arena. In May 2016, Trump said that he would be “willing to talk to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to try to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear program, proposing a major shift in U.S. policy toward the isolated nation.” The following month, he said that he would be willing to have Kim Jong-Un come to the White House, arguing "What the hell is wrong with speaking?” This was not just a “major shift” from US policy, it was utterly unheard of.
Unfortunately, these ideas weren’t to last as when Trump became President he began to condemn North Korea, saying that “the ‘greatest immediate threat’ to the US is North Korea and its nuclear program” In August 2017, in a war of words between the two leaders, President Trump said to reporters that “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States” and that “They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” Such comments only aided in further straining already tense relations between the two nations, but the even larger problem seems to be the people who are surrounding him, namely John Bolton.
John Bolton isn’t just known for his role in promoting the 2003 Iraq War, but is generally known as a major foreign policy hawk with neoconservative credentials. Not too soon before becoming National Security Adviser to President Trump, he penned an article for the Wall Street Journal entitled “The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First,” where he says, in part:
The threat [from North Korea] is imminent, and the case against pre-emption rests on the misinterpretation of a standard that derives from prenuclear, pre-ballistic-missile times. Given the gaps in U.S. intelligence about North Korea, we should not wait until the very last minute. That would risk striking after the North has deliverable nuclear weapons, a much more dangerous situation. (emphasis added)
Necessity in the nuclear and ballistic-missile age is simply different than in the age of steam. What was once remote is now, as a practical matter, near; what was previously time-consuming to deliver can now arrive in minutes; and the level of destructiveness of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is infinitely greater than that of the steamship Caroline's weapons cargo.
It is interesting to note that despite the title, no actual legal argument is made in the article. Still, Bolton argues that due to the idea that at some point in the future North Korea is going to engage in a military, possibly nuclear, attack on the United States, that the US thus has the right to attack North Korea.
Thinking such as this should worry everyone as this is the kind of person who is giving President Trump advice and there is no one to seriously push back on it for the most part. While Steve Bannon and his cohorts aren’t good people by any means, at least they represented something of an anti-interventionist front, especially when one looks at Bannon’s comments regarding the North Korea situation and how it could only be solved politically.
Relations between the two countries seemed as if they might improve slightly with the summit in June 2018 between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. However, as aforementioned, this went awry due to US demands without concessions. What should be noted, however, is the media’s response to the summit, with articles such as Kim Jong Un has played Trump like a Stradivarius by Max Boot in the Washington Post and How Donald Trump Got Played By a Ruthless Dictator by Andy Kroll of the Rolling Stone. Many in the media, in print and television, were incessantly talking about how President Trump was going to ‘get played’ by Kim. Effectively, the arguments revolved around 1) by even meeting with Kim, Trump was putting North Korea on the same level as the US, 2) that diplomacy with North Korea won’t work due to them having reneged on such efforts in the past 3) that Trump ‘got nothing’ from the summit, and 4) it was a mistake to stop the war games. Each of these arguments should be examined in more detail.
Addressing the first point, that talking to North Korea legitimizes them, such an argument doesn’t make sense. The United States and rest of the world already recognizes NK as a sovereign nation, thus giving them legitimacy. However, this argument is more about how the US shouldn’t legitimize the North Korean government and the horrid things it has done. To rebut that, one only has to look at who the US allies itself with, such as Saudi Arabia. People are hand wringing about acknowledging NK, when they are silent about how the US is buddy-buddy with Saudi Arabia, a nation that is currently bombing the ever-loving hell out of Yemen to the point where the Yemeni people are starving and Saudi Arabia is said to have committed war crimes and, some speculate, is possibly engaging in genocide. On top of that, the US has a history of and continues to provide aid to dictators. Thus, the argument that due to Kim Jong-Un’s government oppressing the North Korean people means the US shouldn’t talk to him doesn’t hold water as the US is fine talking to and even aiding oppressive governments around the world.
The idea that diplomacy won’t work with North Korea reneging on deals in the past is quite plausible, however, ignores certain details. The only time the US made major gains with North Korea was when engaging in serious diplomacy, as President Bill Clinton did. In 1994, the US and North Korea settled upon the Agreed Framework.
Just four pages long, the agreement said that North Korea would shut down its main nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, abandon two others, and seal fuel that could potentially be used to create a nuclear weapon. In exchange, the U.S. would provide oil to make up for the fuel lost from the dismantled plants and would build two new “light fuel” plants from which it would be harder to extract nuclear materials. If North Korea did try to get fuel out of the new plants, it would be easy for nuclear watchdogs to identify—and hard to hide. In addition, the agreement promised that the U.S. would lift economic sanctions and its diplomatic freeze on North Korea and agree that it would not use nuclear weapons of its own on North Korea.
This represented a major milestone of progress in US-North Korean relations and proved that diplomacy with North Korea actually worked. Unfortunately, the US Congress refused to provide funding for the project and thus the light fuel plants were never built. Some may bring up the fact that North Korea continued its uranium enrichment program and thus broke the deal, however, that’s not entirely accurate. “The Agreed Framework covered only North Korea’s plutonium program; it said nothing about uranium enrichment. North Korea maneuvered around the agreement but didn’t violate it” and they did this only after four years of the US not holding up its end of the bargain.
The position that President Trump got nothing from the deal is true, but not for the reasons people are arguing, such as him ‘getting played’ by Kim Jong-Un. From the get-go, the US wasn’t making concessions. Specifically, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said before the summit that “the United States [had] not made any concessions to the regime and will continue to hold firm until Pyongyang takes ‘credible steps’ toward denuclearization.” The US retained this stand even after the summit as Pompeo said that the US wouldn’t ease sanctions on North Korea until they denuclearized. During the entire situation, as Washington Post columnist Marc A. Thiessen notes:
Trump made no real concessions in Singapore. He did not lift sanctions, unfreeze North Korean assets or send secret planes loaded with hard currency to Pyongyang. He did not sign an agreement ending the Korean War or offer Pyongyang diplomatic recognition. All the president did was, as a goodwill gesture, suspend military exercises with South Korea — a decision he can easily reverse. (emphasis added)
Demands without concessions, diplomacy does not make.
With regards to the war games, as was just noted, it is something that can be reversed without much hassle. It is important as the North Korean government sees these war games as provocative and that the US and South Korea are preparing to invade it. By not having them, it helps to create an environment where the two parties can begin to discuss and talk out the situation, without the ever-present specter of war behind them.
While far away, there are much closer nations that are quite interested in the peninsula, namely, China, Russia, and Japan.
China not only borders North Korea, but has a long history with the nation, going back to their intervention in the Korean War on the side of the North. While the times have changed, China still remains heavily invested in North Korea.
Generally, the Chinese main priority is stability on the peninsula, especially with regards to the North Korean leadership and the country as a whole as they see North Korea as a buffer between them and the American-backed South Korean government. North Korea’s stability is vital to Chinese interests as there would be major political, economic, and humanitarian ramifications were to North Korean government to be destabilized or collapse altogether. “However unpredictable and annoying the North Korean government may be to Beijing, any conceivable scenario other than maintaining the status quo could seriously damage PRC interests.” To this end, “China’s food and energy assistance can be seen as an insurance premium that Beijing remits regularly to avoid paying the higher economic, political, and national security costs” of a collapse or war.
On the question of nuclear weapons, China is rather wary of North Korea’s nuclear program as they are worried that it could potentially create a nuclear arms race of sorts, inspiring nations such as Japan and Taiwan to pursue their own nuclear weapons/deterrents in doing so put the entire region on edge. Additionally, the Chinese government wants to avoid such proliferation as it could result in nations being more able to defend their national interests when engaged in conflicts with China, such as debates over the South China Sea.
China supports the reunification of the Korean peninsula, however, they favor a peaceful environment to first be fostered without the interference of outside nations such as the United States. They support this via “ direct dialogue, reconciliation and cooperation between the two [Koreas] and [encourage] economic cooperation and prosperity as key factors in achieving unification,” furthermore, to these ends, they don’t favor increased sanctions on North Korea as the view is that doing so creates a more hostile environment. On top of all this, reunification allows for a war to be avoided, which, if initiated by the US or South Korea, would force China’s hand as China is bound to aid North Korea under the “1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which states that China is obliged to defend North Korea against unprovoked aggression.” Furthermore, a war would harm Chinese investments and put their buffer zone at risk.
Russia, while seemingly far away, actually holds an eleven mile border with North Korea and thus is paying close attention to and attempting to influence the situation.
They too, see North Korea as an important buffer. The Russian National Committee of the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific noted that “the most relevant objective is not attaining a predominate position in Korea, but rather the prevention of the entire peninsula falling under the influence of another state, especially one that is not on truly friendly terms with Russia” and thus it is to their advantage that North Korea act as a buffer state to US interests.
Russia is concerned about NK’s nuclear program, however it doesn’t have the primary prominence that it does for the United States or South Korea. Rather that lies with increasing Russian influence in North Korea and their military concerns.
Specifically, Russia wants to maintain and grow its relationship with North Korea, primarily in the economic and cultural exchange areas. Such views affect their support for sanctions as promoting them could negatively affect Russia’s long-term interests. Russia’s economic interests prevent it from honoring its United Nations commitment to economically sanction Pyongyang as it would interfere with their access to North Korean markets and diminish their influence on North Korea. With regards to economics, Russia wants to woo North Korea away from their intense dependence on China, utilizing their special economic zones, such as Rason, which is a home for foreign investment. Like the Chinese, they also want stability in North Korea as it would “ open up opportunities to tap into the energy market on the peninsula itself, and further establish regional economic partnerships,” possibly allowing Russia to slightly blunt some of the sanctions put on it after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Militarily, they are worried about the US’s National Missile Defense plan, which “ if fully implemented, would enhance US nuclear superiority over Russia’s smaller, less sophisticated nuclear arsenal” and so the Russians want to reign in North Korea’s nuclear program as it gives the US justification for continuing to develop and deploy missile defenses which could potentially give the US an upperhand and even dominance with regards to nuclear superiority vis-à-vis Russia.
There are also concerns about a collapse of the North Korean government which could potentially “increase the likelihood that its nuclear weapons–grade material would end up on the black market, available to transnational criminal organizations as well as terrorist networks.” This is of major concern for the Russians given their bloody history with Chechen terrorists which engaged in an act of radiological terrorism in the 1990s, in addition to their terrorist acts more generally. Therefore, it is in Russian interests to work to limit North Korea’s access to nuclear material and ensure that access is in line with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The Japanese have had long-standing problems with North Korea, specifically with regards to North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens, an issue that remains unresolved.
“From 1977 to 1983, several Japanese citizens living in coastal regions disappeared under strange circumstances,” with the truth being revealed in 2002. That year, then-Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, met with then-leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-Il to address outstanding problems between the two countries, which resulted in the Pyongyang Declaration which dealt with several problems, everything from the historical, such as Japan apologizing for the harm done during its colonial rule of Korea to the status of Korean nationals living in Japan. Plans were made to continue talks in October 2002. Unfortunately, things went south when “Pyongyang revealed that 13 Japanese nationals had been taken from Japan and eight of them had died in North Korea” and, post-summit, announced that the five survivors would be temporarily allowed to return to Japan.
The survivors returned to Japan on October 15, 2002 and were greeted with massive enthusiasm from the Japanese public. Initially, it was reported that they would stay for only two weeks, but then the Japanese government allowed them to permanently stay in Japan, after advocacy from the families of the survivors and politicians. Pyongyang was furious at this announcement, as they viewed it as Japan backing out of sending the survivors back to North Korea.
Despite this, the October 2002 talks continued as scheduled, yet focused purely on the abduction issue. When Japan pressed North Korea for information regarding the deaths of the eight other abductees, they were rebuffed. In response, Japan suspended negotiations for nearly two years, resuming them in May 2004, when Koizumi visited Pyongyang again to restart talks, yet nothing of value was gained.
This entire issue launched political careers, such as with Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, of the Liberal Democratic Party, who assumed position in 2006 and, along with his allies, made the abduction issue front and center. He has pushed for major changes to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which doesn’t allow the nation to have a military that can engage in offensive operations. In order for it to go through, the measure would have to pass by a two-thirds majority in the Parliament and be subject to a referendum. Currently, there are problems as “it’s unclear if Mr. Abe’s coalition partners would back the proposal, and [Liberal Democratic Party] leaders acknowledge they don’t expect to win support from major opposition parties” and much of the public is “wedded to the country’s pacifist ways, and polls suggest a majority aren’t ready for Article 9 to change.” If Japan’s constitutional change were to go through, it would allow Japan’s military to acquire cruise missiles and long-ranged air launched missiles which would let Japan attack military bases in North Korea from a distance.
The military threat of North Korea is quite real to the Japanese, who have already had to deal with North Korea missiles being fired near them. Conventionally, there is “the threat posed by North Korea’s guerilla incursions, incursions into Japanese territorial waters as well as attacks on Japanese nuclear power facilities along the coast of the Sea of Japan.” In terms of missiles, while Japan “continues to invest funds and other resources for the development of a regional missile defense system in order to protect the Japanese territory from North Korean rogue missiles,” there are still problems as “the 22 ballistic missiles [North Korea] has tested since February  have all been fired toward Japan, whose capital Tokyo lies just 800 miles from Pyongyang.” Such a situation leaves the public and government seriously concerned about both North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs.
In order to confront concerns about North Korea, not only is Japan increasing its military , but it is also changing its military organization.
Specifically, the Ground Self-Defense Force is going to be put under a single, unified command and the establishment of an amphibious brigade. Michael Green, the senior vice president for Asia and the Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that this is in response to a reinterpretation of Article 9 in which Japan’s military can be used for ‘collective self-defense’ which “will allow Japanese forces to plan for and potentially participate in joint military operations with the U.S. beyond Japan’s home island” and let Japan “engage in anti-submarine warfare, missile defense or other missions in close support of the United States.” This is all being done in response to the North Korean missile threat, but also China’s probing of Japanese waters.
Given all this, the question must be asked: What would a war with North Korea look like on some level?
As to why a war would start, it would most likely be accidental, with either North Korea or South Korea/the US misinterpreting the moves of the other party and while therefore unlikely, is still a possibility and thus should be examined.
In terms of numbers, North Korea’s military is as follows:
● 1,190,000 active, 6,300,000 reserve and 189,000 paramilitary personnel
● “[A]bout 820 combat aircraft, 30 reconnaissance aircraft, and 330 transport aircraft”
● 4,300 tanks and 2,000 special forces soldiers
● 4,000 armored fighting vehicles, 13,000 artillery pieces, 4,500 self-propelled guns, and 5,000 rocket artillery pieces
● 967 naval assets, mainly based in submarines (86) and patrol craft (438)
While some may lambaste the North Korean military as not being a serious threat due to the US and South Korean militaries being better trained and equipped, it doesn’t mean that they still can’t do damage. As has been noted in the past, NK’s artillery could do massive damage to Seoul, the South Korean capital, especially if they utilize chemical weapons that North Korea is thought to possess. There are also the special forces soldiers, which are trained to “cover infiltration into the forward and rear areas to strike major units and facilities, assassinations of key personnel, disruption of rear areas and hybrid operations.” Thus, in case of a war, major havoc could be wrought in terms of physical destruction and the targeting of political, economic, and military sites.
Furthermore, the actual conditions of war for North Korea would be different. The likelihood of North Korea initiating a war is extremely slim, given the fact that they wouldn’t want to have to go up against both the US and South Korea without aid from Russia or China, as China noted in 2017 that engaging in aggressive acts would forfeit Chinese support. Therefore, any war would be initiated by the US and its allies, thus turning it into a defensive war. North Korea’s goals would be simply to survive and push back the invasion, with nuclear weapons being used as a last resort, where as the invading nations would have to either do an incursion into North Korea or more likely a toppling of the North Korean government and post war occupation, something that would be much more difficult and costly in terms of money, lives, and material.
In terms of logistics, a North Korean-started war is questionable as well as it isn’t even particularly known if they have the capabilities to maintain supply lines far into South Korea. The United States, on the other hand, would have serious logistical problems supporting a war on the peninsula as they already “[don’t] have the ability to evacuate [their] own anticipated wounded quickly,” with the New York Times noting in February 2018 that the US has “limited ability to evacuate injured troops from the Korean Peninsula daily — a problem more acute if the North retaliated with chemical weapons.” Thus, there could be serious problems with resupply, which would hamper fighting effectiveness. This doesn’t take into account that current war plans have the US mobilizing “nearly 700,000 US soldiers [that] would be mobilized alongside 160 ships, 1,600 aircraft,” all of which would take time to prepare and actually put into theater.
There is also the question of outside nations. In case of a war, China would activate anti-missile systems near their border with North Korea and provide humanitarian aid, however, Song Zhongping, a military expert, and a TV commentator, noted that “defensive action could lead to engagement if US action on the Korean Peninsula threatens China's core interests.” Russia, too, is prepared militarily. In 2017, Russia’s Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stated that “Russia was getting ready for a military standoff between its unruly neighbor and other states around the world” and “We are assessing this and preparing ourselves. We will not be taken by surprise.” Thus, it seems everyone is getting prepared for a possible battle.
While the situation with North Korea seems to have stabilized for now, as we know, the situation can change at a moment’s notice. The question of war still lingers in the air.
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 Jeremy Diamond, “Trump says he would host Kim Jong Un in U.S..” CNN, June 15, 2016 (https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/15/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-kim-jong-un/index.html)
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 Zeeshan Aleem, “Saudi Arabia’s new blockade is starving Yemen,” Vox, November 22, 2017 (https://www.vox.com/world/2017/11/22/16680392/saudi-arabia-yemen-blockade-famine-casualties)
 Rasha Mohammed, Rawan Shaif, “Saudi Arabia Is Committing War Crimes in Yemen.” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2016 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/25/civilian-casualties-war-crimes-saudi-arabia-yemen-war/)
 Randi Nord, “Is What’s Happening in Yemen Really Genocide?” Mint Press News, June 4, 2018 (https://www.mintpressnews.com/yemen-genocide/243247/)
 Rich Whitney, “US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of World’s Dictatorships,” Truthout, September 23, 2017 (https://truthout.org/articles/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-world-s-dictatorships/)
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 Fred Kaplan, “Sorry, Trump, but Talking to North Korea Has Worked,”Slate, October 10, 2017.
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 Dick K. Nanto, Mark E. Manyin, China-North Korea Relations, Congressional Research Service, December 28, 2010, pg 7
 Ibid. pg 9
 Ibid, pg 8
 Walter Diamana, Strategic Alliance: China-North Korea, International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2015/07/02/strategic-alliance-china-north-korea/ (July 2, 2015)
 Russian National Committee of the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, “The Korean Crisis Management: A Russian Perspective,” Korea Review of International Studies 13:2 (2010), pg 83
 Ibid. pg 85
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 Geetha Govindasamy, Chang Kyoo Park, Er-Win Tan, “The Revival of Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Perspective 37:1 (2011), pg 141
 Jeffrey Bale, The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/chechen-resistance-radiological-terror/ (April 1, 2004)
 Preeti Bhattacharji, Chechen Terrorism (Russia, Chechnya, Separatist), Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chechen-terrorism-russia-chechnya-separatist (April 8, 2010)
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 Tsuneo Akaha, “Japanese Policy Towards The North Korean Problem,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 42:3 (2007), pg 302
 Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan Rightists Fan Fury Over North Korea Abductions,” New York Times, December 17, 2006 (https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/world/asia/17japan.html)
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 Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Mark E. Manyin, Weston S. Konishi, Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 25, 2009, pg 9
 Charlie Campbell, “'This Is All We Can Do': How the Japanese Are Preparing for a North Korean Nuclear Attack,” Time, September 20, 2017 (http://time.com/4949262/north-korea-japan-nuclear-missiles-drills/)
 Tom O’Connor, “North Korea Crisis: Japan is Growing Its Military For The First Time Since World War II Because Of Kim Jong Un,” Newsweek, September 21, 2017 (https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-crisis-japan-bigger-military-role-ashes-war-669217)
 World Politics Review, Japan Aims to ‘Lock’ the U.S. in Asia With a Sweeping Military Revamp, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24549/japan-aims-to-lock-the-u-s-in-asia-with-a-sweeping-military-revamp (April 11, 2018)
 Elias Groll, Dan De Luce, Jenna McLaughlin, Armageddon by Accident, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/armageddon-by-accident-north-korea-nuclear-war-missiles/ (October 18, 2017)
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 Alex Lockie, “North Korea has a massive air force — here's why it's basically a joke,” Business Insider, June 21, 2018 (https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-has-a-massive-air-force-heres-why-its-basically-a-joke-2018-6)
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 Armed Forces, Korean Armed forces, http://armedforces.eu/North_Korea
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